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ESOP'S FABLES: LEVERAGED ESOPS AND THEIR EFFECT
ON MANAGERIAL SLACK, EMPLOYEE RISK AND
MOTIVATION IN THE PUBLIC CORPORATION
[J]ust as quality was the watchword of the 80's in Ameri-
can business,... ownership ... will be the most signifi-
cant issue of the 90's. As pressure for improved performance
and increased shareholder value mounts, the question of
who is going to participate in making the really important
decisions in corporate America will move to the front burn-
er. In a climate of perceived corporate inefficiency and
wastefulness ... and of increased demand from employees
wanting a stronger voice in determining how their present
and future security is going to be handled, the answer to
the question of who is going to participate has the potential
for dramatically reshaping the landscape of the American
corporate enterprise .... 1
Shareholder rights and their influence on corporate gover-
nance have become an increasingly important topic in corporate
law. The recent wave of corporate downsizing in the early
1990's has disturbed our collective equilibrium. Many now chal-
lenge the basic corporate law tenet that the directors hold a
fiduciary duty to the shareholders only and the traditional idea
that the proper corporate goal is shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion.
The concept of the corporation is being challenged because
employees, suppliers, creditors and society as a whole have a
limited role in corporate governance. In relation to employees,
the current corporate governance structure in the U.S. creates
intangible costs to society which the corporation manages to
evade. Laid-off employees suffer both financially and from self-
esteem and morale problems; creditors can be left vulnerable;
consumers lose access to products and services; and the commu-
1. JOSEPH R. BLASi & DOUGLAS L. KRUSE, THE NEW OwNERS 194 (1991) (quot-
ing I. M. Booth, President and Chief Executive Officer, Polaroid Corp.).
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nity can lose tax revenue and charitable contributions as well
as tax concessions already paid.2
Disparities in bargaining power create inadequate contractual
employee self protection.' Obligations exist independent of em-
ployee consent, and disparities in bargaining power should not
allow unjust outcomes.4 There is a preoccupation with a per-
ceived trend toward short-term corporate profit maximization at
the expense of the employee and other non-shareholder
stakeholders.5
The dilemma poses many questions: Is short-term profit max-
imization a legitimate corporate goal? In the alternative, could
it be viewed as a breach of a director's fiduciary duty to the
shareholders? Are the default corporate governance rules, which
permit inadequate bargaining power in at-will employment,
shareholder monopoly over control, limited liability, and fiducia-
ry duty to shareholders only, biased in favor of the corporation?
Are they in need of modification so that the corporation
internalizes the societal costs which result because of corporate
decision-making? Is job security really an implied contractual
obligation? Is employee participation in corporate decision-mak-
ing practical or feasible? Are the voluntary Japanese and man-
datory German participatory models feasible in our U.S. cul-
ture?7 What would be the market reactions to any proposed
changes in corporate governance and would they cause such
volatility as to reduce both shareholder wealth and employee
job security? Is the underlying reasoning supporting our econo-
my and corporate governance flawed?8
2. See David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law
Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAw 1 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed.,
1995).
3. See id. at 5; see also Marleen A. O'Connor, Promoting Economic Justice in
Plant Closings: Exploring the Fiduciary/Contract Law Distinction to Enforce Implicit
Employment Agreements, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supra note 2, at 219;
Marleen A. O'Connor, Global Capitalism and the Evolution of Corporate Governance
Institutions, in PERSPECTIVES ON COMPANY LAw 1, 1-33 (1996).
4. See Millon, supra note 2, at 5-7.
5. See id. at 2.
6. See id. at 24.
7. See Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do
Institutions Matter?, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 327, 328-29 (1996).
8. See Lynn L. Dallas, Working Towards a New Paradigm, in PROGRESSIVE COR-
PORATE LAW, supra note 2, at 35.
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These are all difficult questions. For others, the United
States has no problems, only differences.9 Our people are heter-
ogeneous, and our culture highly individualistic. These qualities
make for an entrepreneurial environment particularly conducive
to capitalism. Relative to the world economy, the United States
is enjoying a time of steady economic growth and low unem-
ployment. In contrast, the participatory models of Japan and
Germany are struggling with low to negative growth and high
unemployment. 0
These responses notwithstanding, it is easy to sympathize
with a downsized employee and to seek alternative forms of
employee self-protection. However, the question remains: are
radical reforms and unconventional legal theories necessary or
do alternatives already exist within the current statutory
framework? The topic of employee owned companies goes a long
way towards reconciling the conflicting interests between share-
holders and employees. If they are one in the same, a fiduciary
duty to the shareholder would also represent a fiduciary duty to
the shareholder-employee. The conflicts between the shareholder
and employee would thus be seemingly removed or reduced.
The National Center for Employee Ownership reports that over
9,500 U.S. companies have employee stock ownership plans,
covering over ten million employees and $150 billion in corpo-
rate stock; and thirty percent of the Fortune 100 companies
have employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs)." These type of
numbers suggest that workers have enough alternatives to
choose among companies which permit greater employee partici-
pation through ownership. With real choices, the inadequacy of
worker self-protection in bargaining for employment is, on the
surface, at least somewhat ameliorated. The subsequent issues
become, do ESOPs really work in affording employees greater
9. See generally Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109
HARV. L. REV. 641, 644 (1996); Mark J. Roe, The Political Roots of American Cor-
porate Finance, BANK OF AM. J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 1997, at 8.
10. But cf. RAY MARSHALL, UNHEARD VOICES: LABOR AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN A
COMPETITIVE WORLD 4 (1987) (stating that the lack of industrial or economic democ-
racy has hurt the U.S. competitive position). Would he make the same statement
today?
11. See Edward J. Giblin & Jack L. Murphy, When Employees Own the Company,
ACROSS THE BOARD, Oct. 1995, at 42.
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protection resulting in happier and more productive employees;
and what are the trade-offs?
Employee ownership may take many different forms.12 This
paper will address the topic of partial employee-owned compa-
nies, and more specifically, leveraged ESOPs in publicly traded
corporations and their implications for corporate governance,
employee risk-taking and corporate productivity. Part I discuss-
es the basic background and operation of ESOPs and how they
are encouraged from a policy making perspective. Part II ad-
dresses the effects of leveraged ESOPs on reducing managerial
slack. Part III examines the implications of leveraged ESOPs on
employee risk-taking. Finally, part IV studies the proclivity of
employee ownership to motivate workers toward increased pro-
ductivity.
I. A BRIEF ESOP STATUTORY BACKGROUND
The Internal Revenue Service first published a ruling allow-
ing corporations to use stock bonus or profit-sharing plans to
borrow money for investment in company stock in 1953, and
"[tlhus appeared the distinctive feature of the Employee Stock
Ownership Plan: the use of financial leverage to allow employ-
ees to buy stock in their own companies without putting up any
of their own money." 3 Subsequently, Louis Kelso created the
first ESOP at Peninsula Newspapers, Inc. 4 From 1973 to 1991
Congress enacted more than fifteen separate laws regarding
ESOPs. 5 According to the conceptual model behind the legisla-
tion, "employee ownership should and would broaden and ex-
pand ownership; encourage capital formation and innovative
corporate finance; improve labor-management relations, produc-
tivity, and profitability in firms; help the economy accommodate
developments in technology, the spread of transfer payments,
and inflation; and create an economic democracy." 6
12. See BLASI & KRUSE, supra note 1, at 21.






An ESOP is a tax-qualified, defined contribution plan of de-
ferred compensation under § 401(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 (I.R.C.), with its primary objective to provide stock
ownership interests to its employees. 1'7 Under I.R.C. § 401(a),
ESOPs must exist for the exclusive benefit of the employees.
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA)Y8 governs ESOPs, granting many exceptions which
defy ERISA's purpose of protecting retirement income. An im-
portant ESOP exception to ERISA is the lack of diversification
rules, defining an ESOP as a stock bonus plan designed to
invest primarily in employer stock. 9 Use of an ESOP as a
technique of corporate financing is recognized under both I.R.C.
and ERISA. °
As a matter of public policy, the U.S. government has created
significant tax incentives to encourage companies to move to-
ward employee ownership. However, the question remains: who
do these policies really benefit?
Usually with an ESOP, a trust is established to purchase
shares of the corporation's stock from either the corporation
itself or its existing stockholders.2' In the case of a leveraged
ESOP, the ESOP (or the corporation in setting up the ESOP)
borrows the money to purchase the corporation's stock, and
then uses the dividends to pay back the loan.
Contributions to the ESOP as well as dividends paid to the
participants (or to the ESOP used to pay ESOP debt on the
acquired shares) are tax deductible to the corporation.' In
contrast, dividends paid to non-corporate entities are normally
paid from the corporation's after-tax dollars. Additionally, for a
leveraged ESOP, the dividends used to pay off the loan are also
untaxed. Furthermore, if the ESOP acquires more than fifty
percent of the corporation's. stock, the lender may be able to
17. See Rev. Rul. 69-65, 1969-1 C.B. 114.
18. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
19. See I.R.C. § 4975(e)(7) (1997).
20. See Ronald L. Ludwig, Design and Purpose of an ESOP: Techniques Special
Features and Incentives in Utilizing ESOPs, 375 P.L.I. TAX L. & PRAC. 83, 89 (1995)
(referring to Rev. Rule 79-122).
21. See James J. Hanks, Jr., ESOPs after NCR: A Blurred Image of Polaroid, IN-
SIGHTS, July 1991, at 3.
22. See I.R.C. § 404(k) (1997).
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exclude fifty percent of the interest income from taxation,'
which often results in the lender charging a lower rate of inter-
est. Finally, a stockholder of a closely held corporation selling
thirty percent or more of its shares to an ESOP can defer fed-
eral income taxes on the sale by reinvesting the proceeds in
stocks or bonds of a U.S. company.'
Many potential uses of an ESOP exist. For employees, ESOPs
can serve as a benefit or retirement program and as an employ-
ee incentive program. As a financing mechanism, the corpora-
tion can obtain debt financing for corporate acquisitions or
expansion using pre-tax corporate dollars for repayment, finance
corporate buyouts, and use ESOPs as a takeover defense strate-
gy. Can these many uses mesh to promote increased econom-
ic democracy? Or is the ESOP a corporate welfare farce used to
further entrench an already slack management?"
II. ESOP As CORPORATE WELFARE AND ITS EFFECT UPON
MANAGERIAL SLACK
A fundamental ESOP issue is the conflicting interests be-
tween corporate financing objectives and economic democracy.
The laws as they exist can be used to further entrench an al-
ready well-bunkered management. Management accomplishes
many objectives in designing an ESOP. Primarily, management
can reduce its cost of capital, avoid the balancing effects of
debt, and accomplish even greater shareholder dilution. All of
these factors lead to a further entrenchment of management.
The costs of raising capital are many and a rational company
seeks to reduce these costs as much as possible. For the public
corporation, raising capital forces one primary decision: the
23. See I.R.C. § 133 (repealed 1997).
24. See I.R.C. § 1042 (1997).
25. See Ludwig, supra note 20, at 91-92.
26. An additional use of an ESOP in a closed corporation includes the creation of
a market for the stock and for estate planning purposes, which this paper does not
seek to address. According to an article in the Wall Street Journal, approximately
85% of the estimated 10,000 to 11,000 ESOPs in the United States have been estab-
lished by privately-held businesses, and roughly 500 new ESOPs are formed each
year by family concerns. See John R. Emshwiller, Taking Strategy: The Pros and
Cons of Employee Stock Ownership Plans, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 1991, at B14.
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choice between debt or equity. Raising equity funds is costly,
requiring underwriters, attorneys and accountants. Potential
shareholders seek higher returns from equity than debt because
their risk levels are higher and their returns variable. Thus,
equity holders are motivated by their full participation in the
upside of a highly profitable business. Finally, equity usually
requires the payment of some type of regular dividends, which
come from a firm's after-tax profit. Thus, these dividend returns
are, in effect, subject to double taxation." Equity also results
in the addition of more owners who may attempt to meddle in
corporate management.
Conversely, debt is generally cheaper to issue than equity, as
there are less agency costs involved, especially when dealing di-
rectly with a bank. Unlike dividends, debt payments are tax
deductible, providing a significant tax shield, reducing their
overall costs. Finally, debt, because of its fixed quasi-guaran-
teed return, will not realize greater returns during prosperous
times. Debt risks only default during less prosperous times. As
a result, it appears that debt is far cheaper than equity in
many ways.
Michael Jensen suggests that debt is an effective form of
capitalization or financing because it helps reduce managerial
slack.' First, a greater debt to equity ratio gives shareholders
more leverage to control managerial slack. A smaller equity
pool allows an investor to control more of a company with a
smaller investment. Thus, debt concentrates dispersed equity
ownership. And with greater ownership concentration, investors
are more capable of actually behaving as owners. Second, debt
reduces managerial slack because creditors monitor the compa-
27. This assumes the dividend recipient is not a corporation. Corporations, de-
pending on their status, receive a tax exclusion on at least a portion of their divi-
dend returns, allowing at least a deferral on the second level of federal taxation until
those same dividends are distributed to their own shareholders. See I.R.C. § 243
(1997).
28. See Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. Bus. REV.,
Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61, 67-68 [hereinafter Jensen, Eclipse]. See generally, ichael C.
Jensen, The Modem Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control
Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831 (1993); Sangsoo Park & Moon H. Song, Employee Stock Own-
ership Plans, Firm Performance, and Monitoring by Outside Shareholders, FIN. MGMT.,
Winter 1995, at 52; Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86
COLuM. L. REv. 901 (1986).
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ny closely with informational trip wires in the form of cove-
nants. This reduces managerial slack as the creditor can actual-
ly exercise some contractual control. With less leeway, manage-
ment must stay on its toes. Finally, in addition to their in-
creased proportional ownership share, investors are motivated
to monitor the company more closely as the increased debt-
equity ratio places a company closer to insolvency. As a result,
Jensen suggests that management has less flexibility when
there is less equity capital and is, therefore, more motivated to
do a better job.29 It follows that debt can beneficially influence
management behavior."0
Underlying the comparison of debt and equity is the idea
that debt is cheaper than equity. If debt is cheaper than equity
(and even has beneficial effects upon management), is there
anything cheaper than debt? Yes, the combination of debt and
equity in the form of leveraged ESOPs is the cheapest form of
raising capital. Even more disturbing is that this form of capi-
tal formation may in many ways deter the beneficial effects of
reducing managerial slack inherent in increased debt.
An ESOP can be the cheapest method of capital formation. A
bank lends money directly to an ESOP (or to a company who
then lends to the ESOP) to purchase shares of the company.
The company issues new shares without having to go through
the expense of a public offering or fulfilling disclosure require-
ments.
The economic reality is that the corporation is borrowing
money from the lender and securing the loan with newly issued
equity shares (in the name of the ESOP). Instead of having to
pay both dividends from after-tax dollars on the new equity and
debt payments on the loan, the corporation simply uses the
dividends to help pay off the loan. These dividends, as well as
the loan payments, are tax deductible. Since the loan is se-
cured, the interest rate is relatively low. Because the creditor is
actually allowed to deduct a percentage of the income earned
from the ESOP loan, it can offer an even lower interest rate.
29. See Jensen, Eclipse, supra note 28, at 68-71.
30. See George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive
Corporate Governance, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1073 (1995).
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Management accomplishes many self serving objectives in
forming a leveraged ESOP. First, management raises capital at
the lowest interest rate possible. The lower the interest rate,
the lesser the effect of debt on moderating management. Sec-
ond, in taking out debt while issuing equity, management alters
the debt-equity ratio only slightly. Shareholder value and power
is actually diluted by issuing more shares. Subsequently, the
debt issuance does not have the same effect of concentrating
ownership in a smaller equity pool; nor is the corporation closer
to insolvency. Thus, investors have little more incentive to be-
have as managers and lenders have less reason to monitor
management more closely. Third, this type of leveraged ESOP
lending tends to have less managerial trip wires, diminishing
the information and power of creditors to reduce managerial
slack. As a result, management has circumvented the beneficial
effects of debt financing. Far from reducing managerial slack,
with a leveraged ESOP, management is further entrenched
with a lower cost of capital that simultaneously diminishes the
beneficial effects of debt on managerial slack. Shareholders
have less incentive to behave as managers because their piece
of ownership pie has actually been reduced and the corporation
is no less closer to insolvency.
Leveraged ESOPs can also be used strategically to help pre-
vent a hostile takeover."' Specifically for large companies in
low growth industries, the increased use of debt in the public
corporation actually serves to reduce managerial slack. Similar-
ly, leveraged buyouts (LBOs) accomplish the same purpose.3 2
By taking over a company through an LBO, the new manage-
ment drastically alters the debt-equity ratio of the company. By
distributing equity and using debt instead, the corporate raiders
execute an economically rational objective for its shareholders:
free the cash so that the shareholders can invest it in more
profitable projects since the company has none. Leveraged
buyouts free cash used unproductively, in turn reducing man-
31. See Mario L. Baeza & Laura A. Taylor, A Closer Look at Defensive ESOPs,
680 P.L.L CORP. 727, 729-30 (1990); Mario L. Baeza, Recent Developments in the Use
of ESOPs in Mergers and Acquisitions and Finance, 751 P.L.I. CORP. 121, 129 (1991).
See generally Timothea Marie Barnatan, ESOPs as a Defensive Weapon when a Hos-
tile Takeover Rears its Ugly Head, 38 WAYNE L. REV. 1877 (1992); Hanks, supra note
21, at 3.
32. See Triantis & Daniels, supra note 30, at 1075-76.
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agement empire building and the. resulting managerial slack.'
Additionally, all the benefits of an increased debt structure also
accrue. However, by using ESOPs as an anti-takeover device,
these beneficial results of LBOs are averted and management
further entrenches itself.
For a leveraged ESOP, if it is given that (1) the cost of capi-
tal is the lowest possible, and (2) managerial slack will not
correct itself because of shareholder dilution, the reduced moni-
toring effects of the debt, and its potential use as an anti-take-
over defense, then the questions remain: what are the benefits
of the ESOP? Do they outweigh the costs? This query logically
leads to an expansive list of questions: Are the employee share-
holders taking on even more risk than before? Are the employ-
ee-shareholders accorded as many rights as the normal inves-
tor? Are employee-shareholders motivated to become more pro-
ductive? Are the new employee-owners truly empowered to
affect corporate governance?
III. ESOPs: INCREASING EMPLOYER RISK IN THE PUBLIC
CORPORATION
A confusing aspect of the ESOP is its inclusion within the
framework of ERISA. By placing the ESOP within ERISA, it is
essentially represented as a retirement vehicle. Thus, the ESOP
doubles as a device to defer tax on earnings and capital gains
just as other retirement vehicles. Whereas some policy reasons
for the existence of the ESOP may include economic democracy,
redistribution of wealth, improved productivity, and capital
formation, 4 it is difficult to see where retirement vehicles fit
into these primary objectives, since it does not seem that the
main objective of an ESOP is to provide a pension.
Although ERISA is a protective statute meant to safeguard
employee pensions from unnecessary risk, most of the protective
measures within ERISA provide special exemptions for the
ESOP. The concept of risk for an employee-owner is an impor-
tant one. Shareholders argue that their power in the corpora-
33. See id. at 1074-76.




tion derives from their willingness to take risks. These risk-
takers provide the necessary financial capital which generates
employment opportunities. Employees also contribute to the
corporation in the form of human capital. This investment com-
bined with at-will employment is a form of risk-taking itself.
From a policy perspective, an ESOP should reduce risk because
it theoretically allows for greater employee participation. How-
ever, this raises two fundamental issues. First, do ESOPs allow
for greater employee participation? Second, what does the em-
ployee give up in exchange for the ESOP, and is it worth what
she gains in return?
A. ESOP as an Employee Investment
There are many factors which diminish the value of the
ESOP to the employee of a public corporation. Despite the ben-
efits to management in the form of tax incentives for capital
formation which the leveraged ESOP represents, it is naive to
think that management would confer a benefit upon employees
without expecting something in return.35 Of course, increased
productivity may be one employer expectation. Others might
include a smaller income, smaller raises, a smaller straight
pension fund, and fewer other benefits. In exchange for these
concessions, the employee essentially takes on more risk. Sever-
al elements of the ESOP create greater risk for the employee:
the lack of choice in adopting the plan, the lack of SEC disclo-
sure, the lack of diversification, the lack of transferability, the
lack of mirrored voting, the discounted present value of de-
ferred compensation, and weak fiduciary obligations."6 The con-
fluence of these factors reduce the value of the ESOP to the
employee because the overall risk created is so high.
35. See Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257 (Del. Ch. 1989)
(reasoning that Polaroid proved that its ESOP was related to employee compensation
by showing that employees gave up pay and benefits in exchange).
36. See Melton, supra note 34, at 382-84.
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B. Choice of Investments is a Privilege not Accorded to
Employees Under ESOPs
To fully understand the excess risk accorded to the employee-
shareholder in the public corporation, we must compare the
normal shareholders to the employee-shareholders under a
leveraged ESOP. To begin, normal shareholders may choose
what security they purchase. In a leveraged ESOP, manage-
ment or the board of directors initiates the decision to create an
ESOP with little or no employee input." Although the plan
must presumably be in the best interests of the employees,"
the employee-shareholder has little or no input in her choice of
investment. The corporation may be motivated by cheap capital
formation or antitakeover objectives which supersede the more
noble goal of economic democracy. Indeed, it is ironic that the
employee is not consulted in the creation of an ESOP that is
supposedly in her best interest and for the furtherance of eco-
nomic democracy. Logic tells us that the first step in democracy
is not the exclusion of the beneficiaries in choosing the future
plan.
C. Weak Disclosure Law Unfairly Prejudices Leveraged ESOPs
Whereas economic democracy suggests that employees need
more information, the leveraged ESOP offers less. A public
offering requires registration and full disclosure under the Secu-
rities Act of 1933, yet a leveraged ESOP offering has no such
requirement. 9 The lack of disclosure is relevant in that the
employee-shareholder is once again afforded less information
than the normal investor.
Generally, purchasers of securities are protected by the Secu-
rities Act of 193340 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.41
37. See id. at 375-76.
38. See I.R.C. § 401(a) (1997).
39. See Ludwig, supra note 20, at 102; Melton, supra note 34, at 419 (stating
that non-contributory ESOPs have no registration requirements under the Securities
Act of 1933).
40. 15 U.S.C. 88 77(a)-(aa) (1994 & Supp. I 1995).
41. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(a)-() (1994 & Supp. I 1995).
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These protections include mandatory disclosure of financial
information42 necessary to make an informed investment deci-
sion, as well as remedies for any false or misleading statements
made in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.'
"The people most likely to benefit from disclosure require-
ments ... are those investors for whom the cost of obtaining
[necessary] information... is prohibitively high."' Securities
disclosure laws are protective of the unsophisticated investor.
"Among participants of ESOPs are an ever-increasing number of
blue collar union employees who are relatively unsophisticat-
ed .... Their need for the Securities Acts' protection is there-
fore compelling."
45
In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,' the Supreme Court held that
an investment contract is a scheme which involves an invest-
ment of money in a common enterprise generating profits solely
from the efforts of others. In analyzing the Howey test, the
Court, in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel,47
held that a compulsory, non-contributory pension plan did not
constitute an investment contract, and was, thus, not subject to
registration under the Securities Act.4 The lack of a disclosure
requirement for leveraged ESOPs distinguishes ESOPs in which
the employees make direct cash contributions ("contributory" or
"elective" ESOPs) from those in which the ESOP shares are
allocated to the employees for "free" (leveraged ESOPs are one
of a class of "non-contributory" ESOPs).
The distinction between voluntary and involuntary contribu-
tions is confusing.49 Childers v. Northwest Airlines' held that
42. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(j) (1994).
43. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(k) (1994 & Supp. I 1995).
44. Sean S. Hogle, Note, The Employee as Investor: The Case for Universal Ap-
plication of the Federal Securities Laws to Employee Stock Ownership Plans, 34 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 189, 190-91 (1992); see also Edward E. Bintz, Fiduciary Responsi-
bility Under ERISA. Is There Ever a Fiduciary Duty to Disclose?, 54 U. Pr. L. REV.
979 (1993); Mark A. Guetlich, Tenth Circuit Survey, Securities Regulation Survey, 69
DENY. U. L. REV. 1019 (1992).
45. Hogle, supra note 44, at 191.
46. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
47. 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
48. See id. at 551-52.
49. See Mario L. Baeza & Laura A. Taylor, The Applicability of Federal Securities
Laws to Employee Bargained for ESOPs, 680 P.L.I. CORP. 703, 708 (1990).
50. 688 F. Supp. 1357 (D. Minn. 1988).
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the Northwest ESOP was not subject to the antifraud provi-
sions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 because the wage
concessions collectively given in exchange for the employee
stock represented a method of deferring income, not a method
of reducing wages to pay for stock.5 In Uselton v. Commercial
Lovelace Motor Freight,52 the Tenth Circuit held that the
employees' individualized agreements to reduce wages in ex-
change for an interest in a leveraged ESOP satisfied the
Howey-Daniel test.53 Presumably, the collective vote ruined the
Northwest employees chance of passing the Howey-Daniel
test.'
In the case of an ESOP, these judicial distinctions are unjust.
Indeed, the Delaware Chancery Court listed the implicit em-
ployee exchange requirement in the Polaroid ESOP as one of
several elements necessary to render leveraged ESOPs legally
valid antitakeover devices."5 Thus, wage concessions are re-
quired to use an ESOP as an anti-takeover device.55 Further,
the unilateral imposition of both the leveraged ESOP and re-
sulting wage concessions together will not require the employer
to either register the securities or be held accountable under
federal antifraud statutes.5" The law allows the employee to go
unconsulted regarding ESOP formation and adoption, and actu-
ally encourages the employer to exclude employee input as to
the wage concessions. Including the employee in the discussion
would result in the employer assuming the expense of securities
registration and allowing the employee-shareholders to avail
themselves of federal antifraud statutes.
Perhaps most importantly, ESOPs deal with stock, not the
more obscure "investment contract." "[T]he public perception of
common stock as the paradigm of a security suggests that
stock, in whatever context it is sold, should be treated as with-
in the ambit of the Acts." 8 In SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.,"
51. See id. at 1362-64.
52. 940 F.2d 564 (10th Cir. 1991).
53. See id. at 576-77.
54. See Hogle, supra note 44, at 217.
55. See Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257, 274-75 (Del. Ch.
1989).
56. See id.
57. See Baeza & Taylor, supra note 49, at 713.
58. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 62 (1990) (quoting Landreth Timber
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the Supreme Court dealt with the issue of whether a company's
offer of stock to its employees was exempt from registration
under the Securities Act of 1933.' The Court upheld the SEC
injunction against further sales of the stock because
the focus of inquiry should be . . . on the need of the
offerees for the protections afforded by registration. The
employees here were not shown to have access to the kind
of information which registration would disclose. The obvi-
ous opportunities for pressure and imposition make it advis-
able that they be entitled to compliance with [registra-
tion]. 61
Investor protection should be a paramount goal for an ESOP
precisely because corporations frequently do not establish
ESOPs for the best interests of the employee.62 When ESOPs
are used to entrench current management and to defend
against potential takeover, "the potential for abusive and fraud-
ulent behavior is clear.'
D. Lack of Diversification Further Increases Employee Risk
The normal investor has an additional advantage in that she
can diversify her investments. A more diversified portfolio re-
duces market risk and achieves risk reduction without reducing
the overall rate of return. Whereas the normal investor has the
capital to diversify, the employee-owner does not. For many
employees, the same vehicle holding their retirement also holds
their only investments. Difficulty in achieving diversity is com-
pounded by the fact that ESOPs invest almost entirely in one
company."
Ironically, ERISA exists to protect employee pensions from
this very type of undiversified risk taking. However, ESOPs are
exempted from this provision and allowed to invest only in the
Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 687, 693 (1985)).
59. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
60. See id. at 120.
61. Id. at 127.
62. See Hogle, supra note 44, at 227.
63. Id.
64. See Adam Bryant, Betting the Farm on the Company Stock, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr.
16, 1995, § 3, at 1.
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originating company. From the perspective of an individual
employee's personal portfolio, an ESOP represents no
diversification.65  In fact, employee-ownership makes an
employee's portfolio even less diversified as she has compound-
ed her lack of diversification by investing both human capital
and financial capital, whether through direct contributions or
sacrificing pay and benefits, in the same corporation. From the
perspective of the entire ESOP/pension portfolio, there is a lack
of diversification on a much larger scale. Further, the employee
risks accumulate even more due to the lack of a real exit
option.
E. Lack of Transferability Exacerbates Employee Risk
The employee's inability to choose to adopt the leveraged
plan and the resulting decreased diversification of the
employee's investments significantly increase the risk to the
employee. However, the problem may worsen. ESOPs have very
strict rules on transferability. As a program of deferred compen-
sation under ERISA, the employee has no ability to sell her
shares of the company until employment terminates or the
employee retires.6"
The inability of the employee to sell her shares tremendously
increases risk. If the company is doing poorly, the employee is
incapable of protecting herself, even with adequate information.
Additionally, the inability of the employee to at least partially
sell her shares eliminates her voice in corporate governance.67
Contrary to economic democracy, restrictions on transferability
effectively negate the monitoring effects that the exit option has
in controlling management and signalling the market. In con-
trast, normal shareholders have this ability to influence and
participate in corporate governance.
It is ironic that employee-shareholders, those in the position
to most directly monitor the inner workings and inefficiencies of
65. ESOPs do have "to provide some diversification of investment for employees
who are nearing retirement." Melton, supra note 34, at 397. This represents one of
the few instances where the retirement security policies of ERISA win out over em-
ployee stock ownership. See id.




the corporation, are completely restricted from exercising this
option. Removing the exit option from any group of sharehold-
ers deepens the entrenchment of management.
Frequently, in the leveraged ESOP, only a small portion of
the total employee stock block is allocated .to individual employ-
ees. This is because the stock is held in escrow and allocated
gradually as the ESOP loan is paid down. Thus, even if the
employee could sell her shares, they may represent a very
small amount. Even if transferability restrictions did not exist,
management effectively restricts the entire block of ESOP stock
from playing an "exit" role in corporate governance.
Another issue arises when the value of an employer's stock
takes a significant tumble. Does the employee, through the
trustee, have an ability to sell or diversify when the company
approaches dire straits? Is anyone held responsible for looking
after the employees best interests?
F. Fiduciary Duties and ESOP Trustees: No One is Responsible
to the Employee-Shareholder
The contradictory nature of placing the ESOP within the
regulatory framework of ERISA curtails the responsibilities of
the ESOP trustee. One of the principal components of the regu-
latory scheme established by ERISA is its fiduciary duty."
ERISA fails to protect leveraged and other ESOPs even though
ERISA imposes fiduciary standards on persons who have discre-
tionary authority with respect to the management of plan as-
sets or administration of a plan.69 The catch is that the lever-
aged, non-contributory ESOP, by its very single investment
nature, gives its trustees limited, if any, discretion with respect
to the management of the plan assets.7"
Whereas ERISA's fiduciary duties mandate diversification
and a prudently managed employee portfolio (including selling
when the market price of a security is tumbling severely),
ERISA exempts ESOPs from these provisions. Further, ESOPs
68. See Bintz, supra note 44, at 980-83.
69. See Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 561 (3rd Cir. 1995).
70. See Michael S. Melbinger, Significant Rulings: ESOP Trustee Decisions, PEN-
SION WORLD, Dec. 1995, at 46.
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are exempted from ERISA's strict prohibitions against dealing
with a party in interest and against self-dealing.7' Several cas-
es serve to illustrate both the disproportionate financial risk of
owning company stock through an ESOP and the weakness of
ERISA fiduciary duties in protecting ESOP plan participants.
In Moench v. Robertson,72 a former employee sued Statewide
Bancorp's ESOP for breach of fiduciary duty.73 The suit was
based on the ESOP committee's decision (the ESOP committee
was the plan trustee) to invest solely in employer common stock
during a two-year period when the stock fell from $18.25 per
share to less than $0.25 per share.74 The controlling language
of the plan stated, "within 30 [sic] days of receipt, the Trustee
shall invest all contributions.., in ESOP stock, except that
the Trustee shall be authorized to invest a portion of the contri-
butions received in other securities as a reserve for the pay-
ment of administrative expenses and. cash distributions."75
Most ESOPs require full investment in the employer stock, that
being the overriding purpose of an ESOP. If the ESOP trustee
has no discretion in investing plan assets, she is absolved of
fiduciary duty. Therefore, as a general matter, by complying
with the ESOP provisions, a trustee complies with ERISA's
fiduciary standards.76
In Moench, the plan left the "discretionary" door open by
allowing at least some small investment in non-ESOP securi-
ties. Here the Third Circuit applied an abuse of discretion stan-
dard to the trustee to determine whether she had violated her
fiduciary duties to the ESOP participants by not diversifying.77
The court reasoned that "an ESOP fiduciary who invests the
assets in employer stock is entitled to a presumption that it
acted consistently with ERISA by virtue of that decision. How-
ever, the plaintiff may overcome that presumption by establish-
71. See Moench, 62 F.3d at 568.
72. 62 F.3d 553 (3rd Cir. 1995).
73. See id. at 559.
74. See id. at 557.
75. Id. at 558.
76. See id. at 571.
77. See id. at 571; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1989).
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ing that the fiduciary abused its discretion by investing in em-
ployer securities."78
With ESOP trustees accorded little, if any, discretion, the
abuse of discretion standard serves little purpose. Even with
some discretion allowed, as in Moench, the Third Circuit
warned that "[i]n determining whether the plaintiff has over-
come the presumption, the courts must recognize that if the
fiduciary, in what it regards as an exercise of caution, does not
maintain the investment in the employer's securities, it may
face liability for that caution, particularly if the employer's
securities thrive."79 As a result, the Third Circuit further insu-
lated the already over protected ESOP trustee from fiduciary
liability. Meanwhile, employees with no ability to sell their
investment in Bancorp must watch idly while the management-
appointed ESOP trustee continues to invest and then refuses to
divest of employer stock while it falls precipitously, heading
straight for bankruptcy.
In Kuper v. Iovenko,0 the Sixth Circuit came to conclusions
similar to those of the Third Circuit in Moench, but added a
twist by throwing the business judgement rule into the mix."1
In Kuper, former salaried employees of Quantum sued their
former employer when, after selling the company to Henkel, the
salaried employees' ESOP was not distributed for eighteen
months.82 During the delay, Quantum stock dropped from over
$50 to approximately $10 per share.'
"Quantum entered into an Asset Sale Agreement to sell its
Emery Division to Henkel."' The two companies also entered
78. Moench, 62 F.3d at 571.
79. Id. at 571-72.
80. 66 F.3d 1447 (6th Cir. 1995).
81. See id. at 1459.
82. See id. at 1450-52; cf. Wulf v. Quantum Chemical Corp., 26 F.3d 1868 (6th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1058 (1994). In Wulf, the court awarded hourly
workers of the same company judgement because the Trustee abused her discretion.
The Kuper court distinguished the cases based upon the existence of the following
factors: (1) after the sale, Henkel refused to effect a trust-to-trust transfer for the
hourly workers' ESOP; (2) Quantum amended the plan to unequivocally provide for
distribution in the event that Quantum sold all of its assets (regardless of continued
employment); and (3) the employees believed they had been terminated when they
left Quantum and went to work for Henkel. See Kuper, 66 F.3d at 1451, 1455-56.
83. See Kuper, 66 F.3d at 1451.
84. Id. at 1450.
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into an Employment Agreement, where Henkel agreed to con-
tinue employing existing Emery employees. The Employment
Agreement also stated that Henkel would accept a trust-to-trust
transfer of the ESOP assets for those Quantum employees who
continued employment with Henkel after the sale. The transfer
of plan assets was not completed until eighteen months after
the stock price had fallen by eighty percent.85 The court held
that Quantum did not breach its fiduciary duty to ESOP plan
participants for its failure "to make discretionary distributions
to... plan participants between [the] sale of [the] division and
[the] trust-to-trust transfer," and the fiduciary duty "to investi-
gate liquidating or diversifying ESOP assets during trust-to-
trust transfer did not rise to [the] level of breach."8
In Kuper, the ESOP allowed the fiduciaries some discretion.
The Kuper ESOP "required immediate distribution of an
employee's ESOP funds upon the employee's termination," but
it "also granted its fiduciaries discretion to distribute ...
ESOP ... [funds] upon the sale by Quantum of substantially
all of its assets or... one of its subsidiaries, provided that
the employee continued employment with the buyer.""
The plain words of the ESOP agreement indicated that the
Quantum ESOP fiduciaries had discretion to liquidate or dis-
tribute before the trust-to-trust transfer occurred." However,
the Sixth Circuit invoked the business judgement rule in con-
cluding that the fiduciaries had no discretion at all:
[G]iven that the decision to make the trust-to-trust transfer
was a corporate .. . decision .... [the fiduciaries] had no
power or duty to override that decision ... [P]urely busi-
ness decisions by an ERISA employer are not governed
by... [ERISA's] fiduciary standards .... There is no dis-
pute that Quantum's decision to arrange a trust-to-trust
transfer was not a fiduciary one .... We, therefore, con-
clude that defendants cannot be held to have breached their
85. See id. at 1450-51.
86. Id. at 1447.
87. Id. at 1450.




fiduciary duty to plaintiffs by virtue of their failure to over-
ride a corporate business decision.89
The employees also argued that there was a breach of fidu-
ciary duty for failing to at least diversify during the eighteen
month lag period." Here, the Sixth Circuit adopted the Third
Circuit's abuse of discretion standard and appeared to take the
Third Circuit's advice in making it a difficult obstacle to
overcome. Despite the fact that the stock's price fell by eighty
percent in eighteen months, the court reasoned that a reason-
able fiduciary would have continued to hold Quantum's stock
during the period at issue.9 The court based this reasoning on
the fact that "Quantum stock [had] closed at or above the previ-
ous day's trading price on 181 of the 402 trading days dur-
ing... [this] period,"92 and that several investment advisors
had rated the security as a "hold.""s Indeed, the employees
must have thought they had a strong argument for abuse of
discretion since there was no evidence that the fiduciaries ever
considered selling the Quantum stock during the price decline
period." Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that an in-
vestigation by the fiduciaries of the alternatives was unneces-
sary unless the employees could prove "that an adequate inves-
tigation would have revealed to a reasonable fiduciary that the
investment at issue was improvident."
Moench and Kuper reveal the inadequacy of fiduciary protec-
tion facing the employee-shareholder in an ESOP. "While the
failure to divest ESOP stock before the employer goes bankrupt
may still be a recipe for an ERISA lawsuit, Moench and Kuper
leave us more optimistic about the eventual outcome for the fi-
duciaries." 8
89. Id. at 1456-57 (internal citations omitted).
90. See id. at 1457.
91. See id. at 1459.
92. Id. at 1451.
93. See id. at 1460.
94. See id. at 1459-60.
95. Id. at 1460.
96. 3rd and 6th Circuits Apply Abuse of Discretion Standard to Failure of ESOP
Fiduciaries to Diversify Plan Assets, 4 No. 5 ERISA LITIG. REP. 16, 20 (1995).
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G. The Last Straw: Voting Rights as a Token Offering Where
the Reality Further Entrenches Management
Yet another corporate governance tool for shareholders is the
ability to vote for the board of directors and other proxy mat-
ters. Once again, however, for the employee-shareholder in a
leveraged ESOP, this governance tool is frequently rendered
irrelevant. Some argue that management entrenchment occurs
in an ESOP because employees are perceived as friendly to
management and are thus more inclined to vote in
management's favor. Although this argument is not foolproof,
the judicial extermination of "mirrored" voting in an ESOP has
made the waters even murkier.
Because large blocks of employee stock in a leveraged ESOP
are unallocated, most ESOPs have traditionally allowed for
"mirrored" voting. Mirrored voting means that the ESOP
trustee must vote the unallocated shares of the ESOP in the
same proportion that the employees vote the allocated shares.
The Internal Revenue Code § 409(e)(5) allows ESOPs to autho-
rize the trustee to vote all plan shares in proportion to the
voting instructions received from plan participants.98 However,
the district court in Reich v. NationsBank ruled that the voting
rights requirement of ESOPs applies only to allocated shares. 9
The court reasoned that "the conflict problem arises from the
fact that 'present participants have no interest in voting for
what will benefit participants in the future if such a vote re-
sults in those benefits going to persons other than them-
selves.'""° Perhaps even more disconcerting, the NationsBank
court gives the trustee full discretion in voting allocated shares
in instances where she has received no directions.10
The court in NationsBank reasoned that in a leveraged ESOP
there is a division of ownership: the allocated shares (usually
97. See Reich v. NationsBank, CIV. A. No. 1:92-CV-1474-HTW, 1995 WL 316550
(N.D. Ga. Mar. 29, 1995).
98. See 26 U.S.C. § 409(eX5X1994).
99. See NationsBank, 1995 WL 316550, at *5.





the vast minority in the instance of a recently formed ESOP)
are owned by the current participants/employees, and the
unallocated shares are owned by the future partici-
pants/employees." 2 If employee voting simply follows manage-
ment direction, perhaps this distinction is irrelevant. However,
if employee voting is a genuine corporate governance tool en-
abling the employee-shareholder to exercise her voice, the abili-
ty to do so through a leveraged ESOP has been eviscerated.
She can vote her allocated shares, but it is left to the ESOP
trustee to vote the disproportionately large unallocated shares
prudently, in the interests of both present and future partici-
pants.
This consequence implies that an "independent" trustee may
recognize conflicts of interest between present and future plan
participants and thus direct the unallocated share votes accord-
ingly. Ironically, the plan trustee inevitably has limited fiducia-
ry responsibility to the ESOP participants and is also often a
member of management. Such a system not only diminishes the
impact of voting by current employee-shareholders but it also
creates a greater lack of accountability for the not-so-indepen-
dent trustee who can formulate reasons for voting large blocks
of unallocated shares based upon the best interests of future
participants. The fiduciary duties of the ESOP trustees are
confusing and the voting rights of employees extremely limited,
compounding the disadvantage to the employee so benevolently
granted economic democracy.
IV. ESOP EFFECT ON EMPLOYEE MOTIVATION AND
PRODUCTIVITY
Having arrived at the topic of the leveraged ESOPs effect
upon employee motivation and productivity, it seems relevant to
revisit the original impetus for this essay. Does employee own-
ership through a leveraged ESOP create any form of economic
democracy? Is it a legitimate answer to opportunistic manage-
ment behavior to place employee job security at risk?
102. See id. at *5.
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At first glance, the concept seems ideal. The director's fidu-
ciary duty would extend to the employee as a shareholder her-
self. Thus, in evaluating a potential layoff in the context of
shareholder wealth maximization, the layoff would be less likely
to occur because a shareholder's wealth is likely not maximized
by losing her job. Combined with increased job security, the
employee-shareholder would benefit from wealth redistribution
while playing a more participatory role in corporate governance.
The employee would be charged with the knowledge that she
can keep at least a portion of the residual value created by her
human capital. Ideally we are left with a more motivated, self-
monitoring work force sharing information with and monitoring
management, while shirking its job responsibilities less. The
net result of a more secure, wealthier employee with a piece of
the action would result in higher corporate productivity.
However, to examine the effect of a leveraged ESOP on em-
ployee motivation and productivity seems irrelevant in light of
the tremendous disadvantages to employees which it creates.
The aforementioned disadvantages notwithstanding, even if one
assumes that employee-shareholders hold the same property
rights as other shareholders, there are many problems with the
hypothesis that ESOPs improve employee motivation and pro-
ductivity.
The first problem is to determine how employees are motivat-
ed. Theories of motivation can be divided into two categories:
(1) content approaches and (2) process approaches. 3 Content
approaches focus on identifying specific motivation factors."°4
Process approaches focus on describing how behavior is moti-
vated.
103. See, e.g., JOHN M. IVANCEVICH & MICHAEL T. MATTESON, ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAVIOR AND MANAGEMENT 159-60 (4th ed. 1996).
104. Some content theories of motivation include: Maslow's Need Hierarchy,
Alderfer's ERG Theory, Herzberger's Two Factor Theory, and McClelland's Learned
Needs Theory. See id. at 159-66. See generally CLAYTON P. ALDERFER & LAYTON P.
ALDERFER, EXISTENCE, RELATEDNESS AND GROWTH: HUMAN NEEDS IN ORGANIZATIONAL
SETTINGS (1972); FREDERICK HERZBERG, B. MAUSNER & B. SNYDERMAN, THE MOTIVA-
TION TO WORK (1959); HERBERT PETRI, MOTIVATION: THEORY AND RESEARCH 4 (1979);
David C. McClelland, Business Drive and National Achievement, HARVARD BUS. REV.,
July-Aug. 1962, at 99; Lyman W. Porter, A Study of Perceived Need Satisfaction in
Bottom and Middle Management Jobs, J. APPLIED PSYCHOL., Feb. 1961, at 1.
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Content approaches focus on the specific needs that motivate
people. Content approaches to motivation focus upon a hierar-
chical need system in which the basic needs such as salary, job
security, satisfactory work conditions, and reasonable interper-
sonal relationships form the bottom of the motivational pyra-
mid."0 5 Self-actualization, esteem, growth, and the need for
achievement and power form the top of the motivational pyra-
mid. Under the content approach, money and job security are
lower level needs, motivating only minimally. However, partici-
pation, responsibility, advancement, and growth are higher level
needs and thus greater motivators.' Thus, under a content
approach, employee ownership must be structured towards
satisfying higher level needs to provide increased motivation.
Under content theories of motivation, stock ownership with-
out participation will not appeal to higher level needs and thus,
will not serve to motivate.
The very nature of a leveraged ESOP removes the content
that could encourage greater employee motivation. For the
employee in the public corporation, the leveraged ESOP permits
no employee choice in the adoption of the plan, no disclosure or
availment of antifraud statutes, limited fiduciary obligations,
limited voting rights (especially in the early stages) without
mirrored voting, and no exit option. In effect, it is ownership
without property rights. This type of pseudo-ownership will not
appeal to higher level needs and thus motivational potential is
limited.
The process theories of motivation, instead of focusing on
specific motivation factors within a person causing behavior,
focus on the external factors causing behavior. Process theories
focus on reward structures.0 7 An expectancy process theory
would evaluate motivation based upon the employee's percep-
tion of the probability of her personally attaining a desired
level of performance, coupled with the potential rewards and
the value the employee places on those rewards. In an equity
process theory, the employee compares her efforts and rewards
with those of others in similar work situations. These theories
105. See A.H. Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 50 PSYCH. REV. 370 (1993).
106. See IVANCEVCH & MArTESON, supra note 103, at 165-66.
107. See id at 167.
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are based on the assumption that employees are motivated by
different rewards and also maintain motivation through equita-
ble treatment. 108
Under process theories of motivation, rewards only motivate
when the employee values the reward and perceives equity in
the reward structure. Why would an employee value the reward
of ownership without property rights? The ownership carries a
large risk factor, including the lack of disclosure and diversi-
fication, stock price risk and the discounted value of deferred
compensation. The lack of property rights combined with other
risk factors creates a high discount factor, reducing the present
value to any rational individual.
An ESOP does not create the perception of equity in rewards
necessary under a process theory of motivation. A leveraged
ESOP's compensation is based upon salary structures, equally
rewarding employees at the same pay scale regardless of indi-
vidual effort and results. Such a system does not create equity.
In fact, it runs the risk of creating free rider problems because
of the weak connection between individual effort and reward.
Even outside of perceived equity, employees in a large public
corporation may feel their efforts are too diluted to affect the
stock price. The actions and reactions of Wall Street and result-
ing fluctuations in stock prices can seem random even to the
experts. The result is too tenuous a connection between individ-
ual effort and the resulting stock price.
There are many problems with past ESOP studies, perhaps
the least of which is that they have yielded divergent re-
sults.0 9 The most recent study on employee ownership and
productivity attempts to analyze all past studies as a whole.
'The relationship of employee-ownership to employee perfor-
108. See id. at 168.
109. See Joseph Blasi et al., Employee Stock Ownership and Corporate Performance
Among Public Companies, 50 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 60 (1996); see also Avner Ben-
Ner & Derek C. Jones, Employee Participation, Ownership and Productivity: A Theo-
retical Framework, 34 INDUS. REL. 532 (1995); Derek C. Jones & Takao Kato, The
Productivity Effects of Employee Stock-Ownership Plans and Bonuses: Evidence from
Japanese Panel Data, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 391 (1995) (suggesting positive productivity
effects of ESOPs). But see James S. Hirsch, Avis Employees Find Stock Ownership Is
Mixed Blessing, WALL ST. J., May 2, 1995, at BI (identifying limitations of ESOPs);
Darryl Jenkins, Another Airline in a Stock Swamp, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1995, at 15.
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mance has been the subject of at least 27 previous studies,
covering a variety of forms of employee ownership and mea-
sures of performance. Few of these studies have individually
found strong and statistically significant effects of employee
ownership on performance."1 A study of the economic perfor-
mance effects of ESOPs, specifically in publicly traded compa-
nies, concluded that no automatic relationship between ESOPs
and improved firm performance exists. 1 ' A problem in the
analysis is how to measure productivity. Should productivity be
measured by profits, output per worker, or share price apprecia-
tion? Another problem is one of attribution. Is the increase in
productivity due to newly motivated workers, improvement in
capital intensity, management, or technical aspects of produc-
tion?"
ESOP studies on productivity are contradictory, flawed or
incomplete. Organizational behavior theories provide little guid-
ance in predicting employee motivation. Some employees may
prefer group based incentives to deter co-worker shirking, while
others may prefer incentives based upon individual
performance."' Designing reward systems is difficult because
individuals are too different. Generalizing one reward over a
large group is ineffective. The distribution of equity across a
workforce will not have the same effect on every worker. In-
creased productivity may be perceived as a benefit of ESOPs;
however, the reality is that employee motivation is too complex
for a generalized result.
In the face of a lack of empirical evidence, and accepting
social science reasoning that employee motivation is too com-
plex for a generalized result, where is the improved productivity
to be found? The answer must be improved labor-management
relations.
Improved labor-management relations is also a complex objec-
tive. It is a product of trust,"4 participation and cooperation
110. Blasi et al., supra note 109, at 66.
111. See Joseph R. Blasi, The Productivity Ramifications of Union Buyouts, 9 NAT'L
PRODUCTIVITY REV. 17 (1989-1990).
112. See Blasi, supra note 109, at 65; see also ROBERT J. KUHNE, Co-DETERMINA-
TION IN BUSINESS 15 (1980); MARSHALL supra note 10, at 186; COREY M. ROSEN ET
AL., EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA 50 (1986).
113. See Blasi et al., supra note 109, at 65.
114. See generally Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process., in PROGRESSIVE
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that can only be accomplished with the proper corporate culture
directed by a willing management. Employee ownership as an
incentive by itself cannot accomplish this objective. Ironically,
the leveraged ESOP provides little motivational reward for
employees and little motivation for management to improve
labor relations and create a more participatory workplace.
V. CONCLUSION
The underlying contradiction of the leveraged ESOP is that it
must exist for the exclusive benefit of the employees. Yet its
very structure, emphasizing its value as a corporate finance
tool, contradicts the exclusive benefit rule. Ironically, manage-
ment gains far too much from a tax subsidy theoretically con-
structed for the exclusive benefit of the employee.
The leveraged ESOP is a phenomenal corporate finance tool
that entrenches management instead of encouraging economic
democracy through employee participation. The leveraged ESOP
has more than all the financial benefits of debt, including the
fact that it is an inexpensive source of capital due to below
market interest rates, deductible contributions and dividends,
and no disclosure and placement costs. However, it carries none
of the benefits of reducing managerial slack and entrenchment
because the monitoring effects of strict covenants and informa-
tional trip wires, more concentrated ownership and danger of
insolvency are nearly nonexistent. Additionally, the beneficial
effects of equity in reducing managerial slack are defeated be-
cause no signaling mechanism exists due to the lack of an exit
option and insignificant voting rights for the employee-held
shares. Employees gain deferred compensation in exchange for
explicit and implicit wage concessions, but are left with no
choice in adoption, no disclosure, no diversification, no transfer-
ability, weak and conflicted fiduciary representation, and no
mirrored voting. In essence, management dictates terms to
employees who have no say, allowing management to grow
stronger on the backs of employees who are bearing greater
risk. This is not a prescription for economic democracy. If any-
thing, it is quite the opposite.
CORPORATE LAW 185, supra note 2, at 185.
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However, a significant objective in the legislative formation of
ESOPs appears to be improved management relations."' Yet
the structure of leveraged ESOPs fails to legally require (either
by statute or by judicial precedent) employee participation. If
some laborers have long suffered in the American capitalist
system and its particular form of corporate governance, those
who sought to treat this affliction are guilty of a degree of pa-
ternalism so extreme as to defeat a fundamental purpose for
which it was intended.
The paternalism evidenced in the leveraged ESOP is a prod-
uct of legislative and judicial failure. Paternalism manifests
itself in the leveraged ESOP through the underlying theme that
management knows what is best for the employees. First, it is
paternalistic to decree by statute that an ESOP must be creat-
ed in "the exclusive interests of [the] employees""6 while, at
the same time, allowing management to unilaterally impose the
plan. Second, it is paternalistic for the judiciary to rule that
securities disclosure is not required for a unilaterally imposed
ESOP, or even for one- adopted by a collective employee vote
(because the ESOP is deemed free or non-contributory). Once
again, this encourages management to decide what is best for
its employees because allowing employees to individually choose
a leveraged ESOP would actually increase the cost to the corpo-
ration, resulting in management incentives to exclude employee
participation at initiation. Third, it is paternalistic for a statute
to allow and for the judiciary to rule that an ESOP trustee
(usually a part of management or allied with management) who
complies with the management created ESOP plan automatical-
115. See BLASI, supra note 13, at 190-92. Indeed, ESOPs coupled with real em-
ployee participation programs have consistently been found to improve productivity.
See Dan Bannister, Making Employee Ownership a Competitive Advantage, MGMT.
REV., Aug. 1995, at 46; Chris Doucouliagos, Worker Participation and Productivity in
Labor-Managed and Participatory Capitalist Firms: A Meta-analysis, 49 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 58 (1995); Edward J. Giblin et al., When Employees Own the Company,
ACROSS THE BOARD, Oct. 1995, at 42; Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Owner-
ship Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99 YALE
L.J. 1749 (1990); Anne Murphy, Taking the Fall, Inc., Sept. 1995, at 81; Portia Rich-
ardson, Making Workers Act Like Owners, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Nov. 1995, at 31;
Republic and McLouth: Two ESOPs on Different Paths, NEW STEEL, Nov. 1995, at 16;
Employee Participation and Labor-Management Cooperation in American Workplaces,
CHALLENGE, Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 38.
116. I.R.C. § 401(a) (1997).
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ly complies with ERISA's fiduciary duties. Finally, it is pater-
nalistic for the judiciary to rule against mirrored voting of
unallocated ESOP shares because of the conflict between pres-
ent and future employee beneficiaries, and to instead allow the
management appointed ESOP trustee to use his best judge-
ment.
Proponents of ESOPs believe that ownership will "unite labor
and management in a common endeavor without changing the
structure of power or prestige between them."117 It is naive
and ironic to suggest that labor-management relations could
improve without changing the structure of power and participa-
tion. Nevertheless, even the famous ESOP pioneer, Louis Kelso,
defended this world view when he said:
A basic tenet of two-factor economics is that the function of
ownership and the function of management are two entirely
distinct functions. It is postulated that any human being
can be an owner of productive capital and that, ideally,
every individual would actually own a viable holding of
such shares. However, it is not a postulate of two-factor
economics that every individual is qualified to manage a
corporation. The ideal corporation is one in which promotion
from level to level in the corporate hierarchy is possible and
easy. Nevertheless, "management is a rare and difficult art;
the health and success of the corporation as a whole de-
pends upon its having the highest quality of manage-
ment."
118
This view, from the employee champion himself, assumes that
adding employee ownership, by itself, without any employee
participation or involvement programs, will improve labor-man-
agement relations. With the leveraged ESOP, there is no legal
requirement to encourage labor-management participation.
Granting ownership without property rights is a smokescreen
for perpetuating the status quo. Absolute management rights do
not create a common interest between labor and management
and a joint partnership in the firm."'
117. BLASI, supra note 13, at 234.
118. Id. (citing Employee Stock Ownership Plans: Hearings Before the Joint Eco-
nomic Committee, 94th Cong. 202 (1975) (statement of Louis Kelso)).
119. See id. at 136.
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"At the core of Kelso's argument is the proposition that the
debt-financed acquisition of capital assets through an ESOP will
create wealth without any new savings or investment by em-
ployees."' Herein lies the fundamental philosophical flaw and
source of paternalism relative to leveraged ESOPs. Economic
democracy, that is to say, a fundamental shift in corporate
governance, seems no more than a secondary goal. Kelso con-
ceived of the ESOP as a method for employees to gain some-
thing for nothing and that, beyond wealth redistribution, labor-
management relations and, hence, productivity would magically
come to pass.
However, the concept that the employee receives something
for nothing undermines any possibility of improved relations
and productivity. Employees receive just about nothing, owner-
ship without property rights, in exchange for something, explicit
and implicit concessions. Management gains greater power and
is encouraged to act opportunistically. Employees receive noth-
ing because the argument was framed in terms of them giving
up nothing. The courts have agreed that securities in a lever-
aged ESOP not approved individually by every employee are
indeed free (non-contributory) and thus subject to less rights. In
addition, Congress encourages and rewards the behavior with
tax subsidies.
Ironically, even Kelso's concept of wealth redistribution under
a leveraged ESOP is both a functional and motivational failure.
As a tool for wealth redistribution, the ESOP faces the funda-
mental failure that its benefits are distributed proportionally to
employee salaries. Those making the most money earn the
greatest ownership share. Indeed, this would seem to create
greater disparities in wealth, even if those employees who never
owned stock would certainly own more under an ESOP than
before. As a motivational and productivity tool, the lack of par-
ticipation and ownership rights cannot fulfill the employees'
higher level needs (content theory of motivation), and incentives
based upon salary structure as opposed to performance encour-
age free riders because they are not equitable (process theory of
motivation).
120. Melton, supra note 34, at 368.
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I do not suggest that Congress' and Louis Kelso's roles in the
conceptual and statutory creation of the leveraged ESOP were
mal-intended, but rather severely misguided. I do not mean to
suggest that all leveraged ESOPs function to the detriment of
employees, used by opportunistic management to entrench
themselves, with little or negative productivity benefits. I mere-
ly suggest that the default rules facilitate such a result. At a
minimulm, the leveraged ESOP must require management to
submit a plan of employee participation as well as continued
implementation which meets appropriate guidelines. At a maxi-
mum, employees must be given: a choice in adoption, full disclo-
sure, the ability to diversify investments and/or sell shares, an
independent trustee with strong fiduciary obligations, and mir-
rored voting.
Corporate finance is the only true purpose for a leveraged
ESOP that is not coupled with the proper corporate culture and
significant employee participation. The structure of the lever-
aged ESOP as a corporate finance tool actually widens the gap
between management and labor. Nevertheless, the problems are
correctable. However, until such corrections occur, the leveraged
ESOP as a response to the call for economic democracy is a
cruel joke at best.
Hunter C. Blum
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